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Abstract 
This article analyses the policy of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) towards the former 
republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in the 1990s during the Yugoslav 
crisis. It argues that MOFA adopted an indirect foreign policy approach since it acted through the 
United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to help foster 
the peace process. The article particularly focuses on the roles played by Yasushi Akashi, the head of 
the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) Sadako Ogata, through whom Japan provided aid during the humanitarian crisis. 
Japan exerted its preventive diplomacy to defuse tensions in the successor republics and to prevent the 
spread of the conflict to Macedonia and Albania. After the end of the conflict, Japan’s policy towards 
the region focused on post-conflict reconstruction and supporting the transition to prepare for the 
European integration process. 
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1. Introduction 
The international community was making efforts to define the new world order in the 
post-Cold War era after the fall of communism as an ideology. Developing countries 
and former communist countries had difficulties in the economic and social areas in 
their reform efforts while converting to democracy. Moreover, the democratic break-
up of a number of multi-ethnic communist nation states into individual nation states 
was a result which had the potential to bring conflict. The conflict in the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (former SFRY) escalated into an international 
war between newly independent democracies in post-Cold War Europe. The war was 
rooted in ethnic, religious and historical factors. Such regional conflicts are starting to 
be considered not only as a domestic issue but also as a security threat to the post-Cold 
War international community since they have an enormous impact. The impact on the 
entire international community presents in the form of refugees, humanitarian 
problems and disruption of the international economy. Therefore, to contain or 
prevent conflicts, not only concerned countries but the international community as a 
whole needed to unite efforts to deal with such threats and render assistance.1 
 





According to UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali (1995), preventive diplomacy is 
action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes 
from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. Post-
conflict reconstruction is a complex concept consisting of a unifying conceptual 
framework systemized by Jabareen (2013). The framework is composed of failed state 
conditions, exogenous intervention, sequencing, security, reconstruction which 
reduces conflict, multi-level actors, inclusive themes and holistic approach, and 
westernization of states. T  a l  Jaba ee  -conflict reconstruction concept 
(2013) to this article, it is argued that the political agenda of post-conflict 
ec c i  i   a f m a failed a e , in this case former Yugoslav republics, 
i  a mal  e e  libe al state.  
Previous research analyzed the influence of Western powers, European countries and 
the US on the Yugoslav crisis, and dealt with Japanese relations with Western 
European countries.2 Huliaras (2007) wrote about Japanese participation in South 
Eastern Europe, and Bechev (in Bacon, Mayer, & Nakamura, 2015) explored the 
cooperation between the European Union (EU) and Japan in the Balkans regarding 
post-conflict nation-building. Both agree that economic considerations were more 
important in Japanese aid to the eastern Balkans, and political motivations, linked to 
Japan's efforts to become a permanent member of the Security Council, were more 
important in Japanese aid to the western Balkans (Huliaras, 2007, p. 27; Becher, 2015, 
p. 207). Glisic (2016, 2017) explored the relations between Japan and Yugoslavia 
during the Cold War. The aim of this article is to expand on previous research by 
investigating the development of relations between Japan and former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in the post-Cold War period and determining the nature 
of Japanese foreign policy during the end of the Yugoslav crisis. Taking into account 
EU enlargement, with Slovenia and Croatia becoming first two EU members in 
 
2 For relations of Japan with the Europan Union see: Bacon, P., & Mayer, H., & Nakamura, H. (2015) 
The European Union and Japan: A New Chapter in Civilian Power Cooperation? England: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited. Gilson, Julie (2000) Japan and the European Union: A Partnership for the 
Twenty-First Century?, Macmillan Press Ltd. Gle  D. H k (2011) Ja a  I e a i al Rela i : 
Third Edition, The University of Sheffield. Mykal, Olena (2011) The EU-Japan Security Dialogue: 
Invisible but Comprehensive, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam. Michito, Tsuruoka (2008) 
'Expectations Deficit' in EU-Japan Relations: Why the Relationship Cannot Flourish, in: Current 
Politics and Economics of Asia, Volume 17, Issue 1, 107-126., Michito, Tsuruoka (2012) The 
Development of Political and Security Relations between Japan and Europe after World War II, Ph.D. 
diss., Department of War Studies, King's College London. Hosoya, Yuichi (2012) The evolution of the 
EU-Japan relationship: towards a 'normative partnership'?, Japan Forum, 24:3, 317-337. 
Rela i  f C a ia, he Ce al a d Ea e  E e a d E ea  U i  a e a al ed i : G bi a, D., 
&  Be i e i , N., eha , H. (2012) Politi ki sustav Europske Unije i europeizacija hrvatske politike 
(Political System of the European Union and Europeanization of Croatian politics), Fak l e  li i kih 
a i, Zag eb. Gla di , J i  (2011) The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of 
Yugoslavia, Yale University. Smith, Karen E. (2004) The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of 
Eastern Europe, Palgrave Macmillan. Be i e i , Na a a (2013) Vanjska politika Europske Unije i 
Zapadni Balkan (Foreign Policy of the European Union and Western Balkans), Fak l e  li i kih 
znanosti, Zagreb. Blockmans, Steven (2007) Though Love: The European Union's Relations with the 
Western Balkans, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. 
C i i e f U i ed Na i  eacekee i g i  C a ia ca  be f d i : Mi k lin, Ivica (2010) Icecream 
and Sun – The European Community Monitoring Mission and Croatia, 1991-1995, a i  a 
eme  ije  (J al f C em a  Hi ). Mi k li , I ica (2011) An Avoidable Failure: 
Peacekeeping in Croatia, 1991-1995, Review of Croatian History 7/2011, No.1, 37-77. 
See also: Gilson, Julie (2000) Japan in Kosovo: lessons in the politics of 'complex engagement', Japan 
Forum, 12:1, 65-75. Michito, Tsuruoka (2013) NATO and Japan as Multifaceted Partners, NATO Defense 
College, Research Division, No. 91, Rome.  
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Western Balkans, Japan-EU relations regarding shared interests in former SFRY are 
illuminated. 
This article combines resources on diplomatic history, contemporary history and 
foreign policy. Firstly, the article uses available historical materials as primary sources 
from Japan and Croatia. They include disclosed documents from Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Diplomatic Bluebook and Tu ma '  A chi e. Secondly, 
primary sources also consist of interviews with Japanese and Croatian diplomats. 
Thirdly, secondary sources include published works of Japanese diplomats and 
officials, such as Hisashi Owada, and the policy magazine Gaiko Forum.  
C ide i g he mili a  c ib i  f he U i ed S a e , hich ac ed a  a ha d 
e  i  the military sphere, the question which was not dealt with in previous 
research3 is the contribution to the conflict resolution in the former Yugoslavia made 
by pacifi  Ja a , a  he f  e  a d ma  e  i  the civilian sphere. 
Therefore, this article explores the role of Japan during the end of the war in the former 
SFRY from 1994 to 1997 in the civilian sphere. Japan as a United States (US) ally and 
world leader during the 1990s in providing Official Development Assistance (ODA), 
led proactive contribution policy towards former SFRY countries to contribute to 
conflict resolution. Due to its Peace Constitution and Article 9, Japan could not send 
Self Defense Forces (SDF) to engage in peace missions during conflict. However, with 
its Peace Cooperation Law from August 1992, Japan managed to participate in United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO) missions in Angola, Cambodia, 
Mozambique and El Salvador. Since the war in the former SFRY was still hot and many 
peace plans failed, it was too dangerous to send SDF to UN PKO in the former SFRY. 
Nevertheless, Japan managed to contribute proactively with its indirect foreign policy 
approach. This indirect foreign policy was exercised in the civilian sphere, through 
means of diplomacy, bilateral relations, contributions through multilateral fora such 
as UN, OSCE and G7, and through providing humanitarian and reconstruction aid. 
Japan wanted to play a proactive role in the international order, often engaging in UN 
endeavours or in the name of the UN itself. Examples are settling regional conflicts 
(UN PKO in Mozambique and El Salvador), humanitarian contributions in refugee aid 
(Rwanda), reconstruction development (Middle East, Cambodia, El Salvador), 
ultimate abolishment of weapons of mass destruction and demilitarization (UN 
Ge e al A embl  ad ed Ja a  al), e a sion of ODA as a proactive support 
to every world region in democratic movements with economic and social efforts. In 
the former SFRY, Japan worked on conflict containment through UN institutions and 
through post-conflict reconstruction and development. Japan also contributed its 
human capital, with high-profile Japanese officials working for international 
organizations. Most prominent was Mr. Akashi Yasushi who was appointed in 1994 as 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to Zagreb. The United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was spread out through Bosnia, Croatia and 
Macedonia to protect human rights, support cease-fire and prevent further conflict. 
Another prominent Japanese working during the 1990s in the former SFRY was United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Ms Sadako Ogata. Japan made 
financial contributions to humanitarian and rescue aid through until March 1996 to 
the former SFRY. In total, 2.4 billion dollars aid was distributed through UNHCR, the 
 






World Food Programme (WFP), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 
the United Nations Volunteers (UNV) programme, the International Committee for 
the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations International 
Child e  Eme ge c  F d (UNICEF), UNPROFOR a d he Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR). 4  Tha  i  h  Ja a  
indirect approach is emphasized through the large amounts of financial aid 
contributed through a broad range of UN aid organizations. For example, this indirect 
approach was part of preventative diplomacy in Macedonia and Albania aiming to 
contain the conflict in Bosnia from spilling-over5. 
This article focuses on the Japanese foreign policy in Croatia because it was in Croatia 
that the focal point of conflict grew into an international war after Slovenia and Croatia 
had been recognized internationally as independent republics. Pursuing 
rapprochement with Western Europe, these two republics became UN member states 
and subsequently the first members of the EU and NATO in the region. Therefore, since 
Japan shares liberal values with the West, relations with Slovenia and Croatia 
de el ed a idl . C a ia  ca i al Zag eb became he lace f  the UNPROFOR 
Headquarters, also managing the Bosnian peace process after conflict spill-over. Since 
Japan promoted non-military cooperation with the UN, the article argues that its 
primary focus was on relations with Croatia. For Croatia, military cooperation with the 
US was of utmost importance due to the rigidity of the UN mandate because 
UNPROFOR was not allowed to enforce peace, analysed in the third section. This leads 
to the disregarded reverse of the military-civilian coin: civilian cooperation with the 
EU and Japan as main actors. During the war, it was often neglected to acknowledge 
the role of other states, actors and international organizations who supported the lives 
of civilians. Therefore, this article limits its focus on less researched non-military 
contributions by Japan. Due to its scope, the article does not investigate the Japanese 
foreign policy in all other former SFRY republics. Therefore, this article sheds new light 
on the area of EU civilian cooperation with Japan in Croatia which was indispensable 
for conflict containment through preventive diplomacy and post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
2. Japanese foreign policy in the post-Cold War period 
Continuation of US-EU-Japan Trilateralism  
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the economic and security cornerstone of 
Ja a  f eig  lic  ha  bee  cl el  li ked  i  ela i  i h he US. Ja a  
e ibili ie   he US a d he i e a i al c mm i  e d e  Ja a  
increase in postwar prosperity under the international order sustained by free world 
countries and led by the US (Gaikoseisho, 1989). Additionally, Western European 
nations, specifically those of the European Community (EC), would have greater 
international roles and responsibilities, since they began to create the Single Market. 
They are key factors for political cooperation regarding the rebuilding of East-West 
relations. Therefore, Japan placed more importance on the construction of a closer 
relationship with Europe in the 1990s.  
 
4 Yagi T. (May 1996, No. 92) Nihon no Yakuwari wa Nanika, Gaiko Forum, pp. 18-24. 
5 Gaikoseisho (January 1  December 31, 1996, 1996). Tokyo: Gaimusho. 
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Japan used the concept of trilateralism to advance relations with Europe. According to 
Owada (1995), the concept of trilateralism describes the international relations 
between North America, Western Europe and Japan as members of the Western bloc, 
which developed during the Cold War. In the 1970s, the US strongly supported 
trilateralism because of tensions between advanced countries and the widening gap 
between powerful regions, due to political, economic, and other problems the world 
was facing on an international level. Japan supported trilateralism due to concern for 
its future, encircled by communist threats from Asia. The era of rapid economic 
development brought Japan wealth, but also social distortions and trade conflicts with 
the US and Europe. Since the relations between Europe and Japan were the weakest in 
this triangle, trilateralism provided an opportunity for Japan to rebuild and facilitate 
relations with Western Europe. Also, it signalled Japanese equality with the US and 
Europe in both political and economic spheres. Owada claimed that attaining a real 
balance in these trilateral relations would become a cornerstone for stronger relations 
between Japan and the Western Alliance. Therefore, stronger and more balanced 
cooperation among Japan, the US and Europe was becoming more and more essential. 
Hosoya (2012) argues that Cold War trilateralism translated into a post-Cold War 
ma i e a e hi ,  i ce b h Ja a  a d he EC ad ca ed i e a i al la  a d 
multilateralism. This research shows that trilateral actors took a synchronized 
approach towards newly democratized countries in Europe, including the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Therefore, trilateralism, together with bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation in international fora, explains the unified position of 
Japan with the US and Europe. This means that a turbulent transition to democracy in 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe concerned Japan as much as the US and Western 
Europe. 
Multilateral Engagements 
D i g he C ld Wa , Ja a  di l mac  a  cha ac e i ed lel  a  a membe  f he 
We e  bl c , b  i  he 90  i  a  e ec ed ha  Ja a  ld h ld ha  le a d 
play a major role in building a new framework for international cooperation with every 
country which shares the same values. Firstly, to foster global as well as regional 
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Secondly, to contribute to building a peaceful 
and prosperous world. In 1995 Japan became chair of the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC). In order to realize its position in the world order, it was important 
for Japan to advance mutual trust with other nations. This is indispensable for the 
f lfilme  f Ja a  e ibili ie  i  he i e a i al c mm i . Beca e f 
Japan  Sec d W ld Wa  legac , i  was necessary to regain the trust of the 
international community as a country striving for pacifism and anti-militarism. To 
realize this, on the 50th anniversary of the Second World War on 15 August 1995, Prime 
Mi i e  T miichi Ma ama i ed a a eme   e e  Ja a  em e over the 
a . I  a  decla ed ha  Ja a  f e a h h ld be  make e e  eff   b ild 
world peace in line with its no- a  c mmi me : B ildi g f m  dee  em e  
this occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, Japan must eliminate self-
righteous nationalism, promote international coordination as a responsible member 
of the international community and, thereby, advance the principles of peace and 
democracy. At the same time, as the only country to have experienced the devastation 
of atomic bombing, Japan, with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, 
must actively strive to further global disarmament in areas such as the strengthening 





Ja a  a e f  i  a  a d la   e  he i i  f h e h  e i hed. 6 Japan has 
high regard for respect of basic human rights, democracy and pacifism as ideals 
included in its Constitution. To realize these ideals the international community needs 
to cooperate since interdependence is rapidly deepening in a globalizing world. 
Therefore, responsibility for its role in the international community is the foundation 
f Ja a  a e i e e . 
According to Iokibe (2011), Japanese diplomacy faced several challenges in the post-
Cold War period. Firstly, the Japan-US alliance needed to be redefined, strengthened 
and expanded to deal with new challenges and threats. Secondly, Japan needed to 
actively participate in multilateral frameworks regionally and internationally. The 
third challenge was related to security matters; Japan was expected to greatly expand 
its international role and international contributions, such as in the UN fora. Lastly, 
Japanese diplomacy needed to become more proactive, especially regarding its 
relationship with the US. Later in 1998, this could be observed in Obuchi's concept of 
h ma  ec i  a d he i i ia i e  ba  la dmi e  (I kibe, 2011). The ef e, Ja a  
engaged in a multilateral regional (Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
 CSCE, later OSCE and EU) and global (UN) framework to help resolve the Yugoslav 
crisis. Japan expanded its international role regarding security matters by engaging 
first with Cambodia, and then with the former Yugoslavia through the UN. This shows 
the expansion of the Japanese foreign policy horizon towards Europe after the Cold 
War. Since Japan emerged as an economic power comparable to the US, it was 
expected to play a larger role globally and not to focus only on Asia.  
Major challenges facing the international community remained unresolved: economic 
recovery of the former Eastern bloc; international conflict in former Yugoslavia; the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles; the suspected development 
of nuclear weapons in North Korea and various difficulties in the countries of the 
former Soviet Union. A new approach was necessary; the framework of Japan-Europe-
US trilateral cooperation and regional institutions needed to be explored further, 
especially through partnerships with former Eastern bloc and developing countries. To 
that effect, in April 1993, the G7 Russia summit was held in Tokyo, where it created an 
international framework for assistance coordination and compiled a package of 
specific measures. The G7 Russia summit also reaffirmed a united position in the UN 
and the commitment to diplomatic resolution of the conflict in Croatia, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
3. Japan s Indirect Approach to Croatia: G7 and UN 
Japan did not want to risk the future of its market in the region by siding with any 
nation of the former SFRY.7 For Japan, further spread of conflict and a humanitarian 
crisis was of the utmost concern. By 1995, Japan provided 12 million dollars in 
humanitarian aid and economic assistance as preventive diplomacy for possible spill-
over of tensions to Macedonia and Albania, and later to Hungary.8 
 
6 MOFA. (2018, October 28). Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama "On the occasion of the 50th 
anniversary of the war's end". Retrieved from https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama-
/9508.html. 
7 I e ie  i h Se bia  Amba ad   Ja a  M . Ne ad Gli i , 27 February 2019, Tokyo. 
8 Gaikoseisho (January 1  December 31, 1995, 1995). Tokyo: Gaimusho. 
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Croatia and Japan have been indirectly connected through multilateral international 
organizations, especially the UN. Japan had indirect insight into a situation in the 
former SFRY through its nationals working as UN officials. Japanese UN officials were 
able to use their position to ask MOFA for more aid and humanitarian assistance. Since 
Slovenia and Croatia had already become UN members, they were more politically 
receptive of cooperation than other former republics. Moreover, New Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro, FRY) was under UN sanctions.   
On 4 January 1994 Mr. Yasushi Akashi was appointed as Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General for UNPROFOR, after a successful UN PKO mission in Cambodia, 
and led the mission from the regional headquarters in Zagreb. The mission included 
military and civil affairs (including civilian police), public information and 
administrative components. 9  Japan made contributions towards reaching a peace 
settlement in the former Yugoslavia with financial help, personnel and with its 
proactive diplomatic efforts of officials in the framework of the UN.10  
C a ia  P e ide  F a j  T ma  emai ed fai hf l  he principles of the UN 
Charter and was willing to prolong the UNPROFOR mandate. However, some 
problems remained  UNPROFOR did not fulfil its most essential task, full 
implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions. This was the cause of 
Croatian government's trust decline in UNPROFOR. 
The ef e, P e ide  T ma  mai ai ed c ac  i h a e leade  he c ide ed 
crucial for the success of Croatian foreign policy, future membership in the NATO and 
EU. The so-called Contact Group (CG) consisted of the US President William Clinton, 
the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, German Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl, President of the Republic of France, Francois Mitterand and Prime Minister of 
the United Kingdom, John Major. On 27 July 1994 Preiden  T ma  e  he 
Contact Group in order to make them realize that this was the time to show strength 
and determination in applying decisions made by the Security Council and the most 
important actors of international community. He informed them that the Serbs were 
stalling negotiations hoping that with time they would achieve legalization of their 
achievements gained through aggression. The President emphasized the fact that the 
international community clearly showed that the United Nations Protected Area 
(UNPA) were occupied parts of Croatia and stated that Croatia would never give them 
up.11 The G7 i  Na le  c fi med he C ac  G  eace la , i h a ca  a d 
ick  a c i  a ach hich a  a l  cce f l  FRY broke off relations with 
Bosnian Serbs on 19 July to get sanctions lifted as the international isolation had led 
to a grave economic situation. However, Bosnian Serbs continued to reject the peace 
plan since they occupied 70 per cent of the Bosnian territory. Drastic measures such as 
a weapons embargo on Muslims and air raids on Serbs were considered.12  
The acts of hostilities did not cease  acts of aggression on Dubrovnik and attacks on 
Bosnia and Herzegovina by rebel Serbs from UNPA in Croatia, areas which 
UNPROFOR needed to protect. Therefore, President T ma  e  he P e ide  
of the UN Security Council, Ms Madeleine Albright, that the Republic of Croatia 
 
9 Daniel Bethlehem and Marc Weller, ed. (1997) The Yugoslav Crisis in International Law, Part of Cambridge 
International Documents Series, Cambridge University Press. 
10 Cambodia, Somalia and SFRY received each $200,000,000 aid from Japan. Foreign Policy Speech by Foreign 
Minister Watanabe to the 126th Session of the National Diet, January 22, 1993.  
11 #055/94. T ma '  a chi e. 





urgently requests assistance from the UN in ending these attacks. Specifically, the 
Government of Croatia requests air strikes on the attacking forces. 13 However, the UN 
did not have sufficient military resources to address the situation. That is why the UN 
for the first time in its history coodinated its efforts with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) for operational support. General Secretary Boutros-Ghali wrote 
that the most developed example of operational support to the UN was NATO's 
provision of air power for UNPROFOR. The UN provided techical advice to NATO 
which handled operation on its own.14 P e ide  T ma  a ed NATO air strikes 
against targets in the UNPA that were being used for attacks on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina from Croatian soil by rebel Serbs. Approval of NATO's proposal for Close 
Air Support for UNPROFOR was granted for the duration of one week, starting from 
2000 GNT on 18 November 1994. The President also stated that Croatia was prepared 
to negotiate with NATO for Close Air Support on a longer-term basis.15 The President 
was satisfied with the effective action of NATO Air Force on 21 November 1994 in the 
occupied part of Croatia, undertaken upon request of the Special Representative Mr 
Akashi and Commander of UNPROFOR,  and he encouraged UNPROFOR to take 
control of those borders of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina which aligned with the 
UNPA. The Republic of Croatia approved in principle the extension of the NATO Close 
Air Support under condition that the operations are conducted in full respect of the 
e eig  igh  f C a ia a d i  f ll c di a i  i h C a ia  a h i ie . 16 In 
1995, the conflict got worse. NATO continued aerial bombardment to destroy Bosnian 
Se b  f h ld  a d libe a e he UN PKO membe  held a  h age . The international 
community finally agreed that stronger actions, including military ones, were 
necessary to contain Serbian military power.17 
H e e , a  he begi i g f 1995, acc di g  le e  f m P e ide  T ma   
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, the Croatian government was seriously considering 
breaking off cooperation with the UN.18 Although the UN Security Council confirmed 
Croatian sovereignty over the disputed UNPA, UNPROFOR was not willing to use force 
to achieve this goal, upholding the principle of solving conflict through negotiations. 
Upholding the status quo benefited the Serbian occupiers, thus UNPROFOR was 
blocking NATO and Croatia to return lost territory. 
P e ide  T ma  e  Sec e a -General Boutros-Ghali about how the lack of 
progress in resolving the Yugoslav crisis disrupted international peace and paralyzed 
numerous international fora. He acknowledged the initial positive effects of the Vance 
Plan and the UNPROFOR mission and that, together with UNHCR, Ms. Sadako Ogata 
and other humanitarian organizations had made significant contributions regarding 
humanitarian needs. However, despite UNPROFOR's endeavours, none of the 
provisions from various Resolutions had been implemented, and neither had  the 
control of the Croatian border which was critical for the peace process. The President 
concluded that although UNPROFOR has played an important role in stopping 
violence and major conflicts in Croatia, it is an indisputable fact that the present 
character of the UNPROFOR mission does not provide conditions necessary for 
establishing lasting peace and order in the Republic of Croatia, a sovereign UN 
 
13 #072/94. T ma '  a chi e. 
14 Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1995) An Agenda for Peace, United Nations, New York. 
15 #073/94. T ma '  a chi e. 
16 #074/94. T ma '  a chi e. 
17 Gaikoseisho (January 1  December 31, 1996, 1996). Tokyo: Gaimusho. 
18 # 006/95. Tu man's archive. 
Peric, ANZJES 11(2) 
 
24 
Member State. 19 The President discussed all questions regarding withdrawal with 
Special Representative Mr. Akashi and permitted further operations of the 
Headquarters, responsible for continuing support to operations in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Lastly, it was emphasized that Croatia would stay fully commited to the 
interests of the international community focused on the peaceful establishment of a 
new international order in the region.20  
In order for the UN to replace UNPROFOR and reverse the failures and loss of trust, 
the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) was established on 31 
March 1995. 21  On 30 July 1995, Special Representative Mr Akashi and General 
Bernard Janvier met with Serbian rebels in the town of Knin, where the conflict had 
igi a ed. M . Aka hi e a e  P e ide  T ma  ab  hi  mee i g. M . 
Akashi's negotiation efforts ensured a cease-fire and further negotiations, but failed to 
recognize that the Serbian claim over territorial authority was gained through an 
cc a i . Thi  i  h  P e ide  T ma  did  elc me he e l  f eg ia i  
since Mr. Akashi did not mention UNCRO who had a mandate in Croatia, but only Knin 
leadership and the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK), which equated to an 
acknowledgment of Serbian leadership, and denial of Croatian sovereignty over the 
disputed territory.  
According to Tsukimura (2006), the international community did not recognize the 
pseudostate the Republic of Serbian Krajina, but allowing Bosnian Serbs to participate 
equally in negotiations was a partial acknowledgement of recognition. 22  This 
negotiation attempt of Mr. Akashi can be interpreted as an attempt to stop conflict at 
its origin place, and improve the humanitarian situation while upholding UN neutrality 
principles. In the post-Cold War period, the UN started to deal with non-state actors, 
making these negotiations possible.23  
The end of the so-called crisis in former Yugoslavia was not resolved until the Croatian 
A m  decided  f ee i  cc ied e i ie  i h he hel  f NATO  i e e i . I  
the civilian sphere, the EU achieved positive effects through the usage of all available 
instruments of conditionality and implementation of international law. However, the 
negative effects outstripped the positive ones: such as the problematic implementation 
of sanctions, the mismatch between events and realization of their importance, 
inadequacy of international legislation, various national interests, the decision to 
implement force in the UN framework, and the clash of interests among political 
partners. 24  In this civilian sphere, Japan could contribute with diplomatic and 
monitoring personnel only through the UN and OSCE, and was indecisive when it came 
to taking a more firm stance on political decisions, always taking into account the 
position of the US and UN.   
Croatian military operations were victorious and brought the Knin area back under 




21 UNCRO consisted of 6,581 troops, 194 military observers and 296 civilian police. Mandate was terminated on 15 
January 1996. United Nations. 
22 Tsukimura, T. (2006) Ethnopolitical Leaders in Internal Wars in Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Japan: University of Tokyo Press. 
23 Akashi, Y., Okamoto, Y. (1998, June, No. 119.) Gurobarizeshon wa Nihonjin no PKO Ishiki ni mo, Gaiko Forum, 
pp. 82-87. 
24 Be i e i , Na a a (2013) Vanjska politika Europske Unije i Zapadni Balkan (Foreign Policy of the European 





compromise. After the achievement of the Dayton Peace Agreement, war in Croatia 
officialy ended with signing of the Erdut Agreement on 12 November 1995, peaceful 
reintegration of east Slavonia with the rest of Croatian territory and normalization of 
political relations with Serbia and Montenegro.25 
According to Tsukimura (2006) the main reason why the Dayton peace negotiations 
succeeded while previous peace conferences failed, was because in Dayton for the first 
ime P e ide  T ma , Mil e i  a d I e beg i  ga he ed a  leade  f e ec i e 
nations  T ma  a  leade  f all C a , Mil e i  a  a leade  f all Se b  a d 
I e beg i  a  a leade  f all M lim , e ee  b  he US. The i e a i al 
community had to accept these leaders as respresentatives of their peoples, not their 
countries. It means that in the former SFRY peoples were in war, not republics.26 
4. Role of Japan in Peace Implementation and Reconstruction 
Japan's position regarding the peace process in the former Yugoslavia was that ethnic 
conflict was essentially a European problem, but from humanitarian standpoint and 
from the standpoint of creating a new international order after the Cold War, it had 
global implications. Therefore, Japan wanted to be engaged in peace implementation 
and reconstruction processes, so it could assume its role in the world, commensurate 
with its economic power. On 8 March 1995, the EU Commission sent the 
communication E e a d Ja a : The Ne  S e   he C cil. Af e  The Hague 
declaration, the Next Steps defined more specifically the areas of cooperation. The EU 
actively supported and wanted to participate in Japan's greater political involvement 
in global foreign and security policy (Keck, 2013: p. 120). The EU encouraged Japanese 
involvement in the Yugoslav crisis, while after Japanese lobbying it was agreed that the 
EU will join the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Cooperation (KEDO) (Keck, 
2013: p. 122). Therefore, for Japan engagement in Yugoslav crisis was beneficial for its 
foreign policy and for improving cooperation with the EU. Vice versa, an engagement 
by the EU in the Asia could be anticipated. 
After the Dayton Agreement, a peace implementation phase followed in Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. An international military and civilian support system were 
provided to the parties who secured peace implementation. Instead of UNPROFOR, 
UNCRO took over and an additional 60 000 NATO IFOR forces which were deployed 
to secure compliance with the Dayton Agreement. Regarding public welfare, 
humanitarian and civil aid, political means to hold elections, reconstruction and 
mechanisms for adjusting aid measures were agreed upon. 27  Securing permanent 
peace and the implementation of the Dayton Agreement by all parties was the next task 
for the international community, and therefore for Japan as well. The MOFA 
recognized the peacebuilding in former Yugoslavia as international task for building a 
post-Cold War order in Europe.28 Therefore, Japan acted as an active member of the 
 
25 Mi la  T ma  ed. (2015) Tu manov arhiv (Tu man's archive), H a ka e ili a aklada, H a ki 
institut za povijest, Book IV „Godine pobjede: 1994. i 1995. (The Years of Victory: 1994 and 1995)“, Ante Nazor: 
Pregled djelovanja hrvatskih snaga u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini 1990-ih (An Overview of the Actions of 
Croatian Military Forces in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
26 Tsukimura, T. (2006) Ethnopolitical Leaders in Internal Wars in Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Japan: 
University of Tokyo Press. 
27 Gaikoseisho (January 1  December 31, 1996, 1996). Tokyo: Gaimusho. 
28 Gaikoseisho (January 1  December 31, 1996, 1996). Tokyo: Gaimusho. 
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Peace Implementation Council (PIC) in the civilian sphere. Japanese efforts after 
Croatia extended to other former SFRY republics, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina.29  
Chart below is adopted from MOFA Diplomatic Bluebook and it clearly divides civilian 
cooperation and military cooperation, as well as high-politics diplomatic activities and 
the activities on site. Japanese peace implementation mechanisms in Bosnia are very 
similar to those in Croatia: diplomatic activity in PIC, comunication with UN High 
Representative Carl Bildt and taking role in Steering Committee where Japan directly 
involved with EU and G7 plus Russia. Japanese actions in civilian sphere are the main 
reason why the role of Japan in peace implementation processes in former SFRY is 
disregarded. 
30 
Acc di g  C a ia  Amba ad  i  Ja a , M . D a e  H a i , Ja a e e 
humanitarian aid was even greater in Bosnia and Hercegovina than in Croatia. 
Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was active in the region in all 
republics of former SFRY. Once Croatia and Slovenia fulfiled the Copenhagen criteria 
for joining EU, JICA's aid was replaced with EU programs. Still, even today JICA is an 
active developmental internatonal actor in remaining republics.31 
Japan used civilian tools in its foreign policy towards former SFRY republics during 
and after the war. As a measure of conflict preventive diplomacy for surrounding 
countries, Japan contributed 180 million dollars for humanitarian and refugee aid 
until 1996. In a diplomatic capacity Foreign Minister Yohei Kono visited Croatia and 
Hungary from 28 April to 2 May 1995 to talk with the parties in conflict and in that way 
participated actively in ensuring a peaceful resolution to the conflict. During his visit 
 
29 Gaikoseisho (January 1  December 31, 1998, 1998). Tokyo: Gaimusho. 
30 Gaikoseisho (January 1  December 31, 1998, 1998). Tokyo: Gaimusho. Translated from Japanese. 
31 Hrasti , Dra en. Relations between Republic of Croatia and Japan.” Interview with Marcela Peri . Embassy 
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to Croatia expectations from Japan regarding economic recovery rose. Foreign 
Minister Kono also participated in a London conference where Japan took part in the 
steering committee related to peace initiative implementation in the newly formed 
civilian sector.32 
The most visible face of aid  was a collaboration project between the UNHCR and the 
Japanese government for building a refugee shelter in Croatia near the city of Sisak. 
This project was promoted by Foreign Minister Kono during his visit to Croatia. Japan 
wanted to continue its efforts in peacebuilding even after the war. This project makes 
visible the cooperation of MOFA officials who were sent as monitors to the former 
SFRY and who drafted the plan for a refugee center with UNHCR staff members. 
Construction fee, management fee and all expenses were covered by Japanese 
donations to UNHCR. Two of the UNHCR members who led the refugee center project 
were Japanese nationals. They also managed to get support from other Japanese 
nationals living in Zagreb who formed an NGO and went to the center to help with 
origami, knitting, ikebana and choir workshops to help rehabilitate refugees. The 
shelter had Croatian, Serbian and Muslim refugees which made it challenging to run. 
The purpose of the shelter for Japan was not only to contribute in resolving problems 
between Yugoslav nations, but also on a grass-roots level to contribute to mutual 
understanding between each nation and Japan. This project was considered to be a 
necessary pillar of international contribution regarding humanitarian aid for refugees. 
It materialised Japanese diplomacy goals and became one of the symbols of Japan's 
humanitarian aid.33 
After the Dayton Agreement, Japan started to normalise relations with all republics of 
the former Yugoslavia. With restarting trade, impoverished economies turned to 
improvement. Japan still did not recognized FRY (Serbia and Montenegro), due to 
concern with a status problem in the UN and condemnation as an aggressor in the 
international community. However, as sanctions were lifted, civilian economic 
missions were exchanged. Therefore, rapprochement was mainly in the economic 
sphere. However, Japanese business circles took more interest in Slovenia and Croatia, 
favoured by the international community, after private economic visits in July. In 
December 1996, exchanges of the Japan Croatia Parliamentary Friendship Alliance 
a ed. C a ia  Vice P e ide  G a i  i i ed Ja a  and exchanged views with 
Representative House Head Ito, Foreign Minister Ikeda and Transportation Minister 
Sato. Strong requests for opening a Japanese Embassy in Zagreb and supply of ODA 
were made. 
Japan played a role in election monitoring in Bosnia. In order to implement peace and 
establish state institutions, the Peace Implementing Committee (PIC) attended by 
Japanese Foreign Minister Takamura, agreed to hold elections in Bosnia by the 
summer of 1997. NATO's deterrence force IFOR was replaced with a Stabilisation 
Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR). Remaining tasks for the international 
community were the safe return of refugees, promotion of resettlement, securing 
freedom of movement, carrying out municipal elections and other peace 
implementation processes in the civilian sector. In January 1997 Japan recognized 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and a month later diplomatic relations were established. In 
July Foreign Minister Ikeda visited Sarajevo and diverse personnel and financial aid 
 
32 Gaikoseisho (January 1  December 31, 1996, 1996). Tokyo: Gaimusho. 
33 Matsumoto Hiroshi (March 1997, No. 103) Kuroachia Nanmin Sheruta Kensetsu, Gaiko Forum, pp. 58-59. 
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were provided, such as election monitoring with 29 members in the OSCE framework, 
130 million dollars for reconstruction and 87 million dollars for humanitarian aid.34 
In 1997, the PIC concluded that peace implementation in Bosnia in the civilian sector 
was slower than expected, since the concerned parties did not fully adopt 
implementation measures. It was decided that if implementation did not suffice, the 
High Representative's authority would be strengthened, and he would be able to decide 
on measures if the parties themselves could not reach agreement. It was clear that the 
international community became more decisive acting as a protector of human rights. 
Furthermore, positive development was that postponed municipal elections went 
peacefully, mirroring national distribution. There was a fear of incidents, since those 
forms of elections had caused an outbreak of conflict and ethnic cleansing. This is why 
holding legitimate elections that would secure stability was indispensable in Bosnia. 
The Keidanren mission visited Slovenia in October 1998 and views on strengthening 
economic relations were exchanged. To promote technical cooperation, experts from 
Japan were dispatched for the long term. The promotion of Japanese language and 
education was planned at Ljubljana University. In Croatia, Japan also started 
providing ODA for technical and cultural cooperation. In February 1998 the Japanese 
Embassy was established in Zagreb. In order to ensure stability in Macedonia, Japan 
provided interest-free loans, repaid public debt of 530 million yen and, through JICA, 
engaged in technical cooperation.35 The aid and loans were supplied through civilian 
groups such as Keidanren, bilateral and multilateral agencies such as ODA, JICA and 
UNHCR. Japan's main stabilisation measure was economic aid in post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
5. Conclusion 
The conflict in the former SFRY and the subsequent international war between the 
Republic of Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro, together with ethnic conflicts in 
Bosnia, was the biggest conflict of the post-Cold War period in Europe. The influx of 
refugees and the concomitant humanitarian crisis endangered Europe. War stopped 
the functioning of economies in transition to the liberal market and curtailed European 
and Japanese involvement in the region. Until now, researchers have only looked at 
the influence of the EU, UN, NATO, US and Western European countries in the 
Yugoslav crisis, but the Asian part of the ideological West  Japan - has been 
overlooked. These ideologically close countries and international institutions 
continued their relations, upholding liberal values in the post-Cold War period in order 
to stabilize the new world order, created through the emergence of new sovereign 
countries after the fall of communism. Therefore, this article sheds new light on the 
Asian aspect of the West, the role of Japan, during the end of the war in former SFRY. 
Japan regarded the Yugoslav crisis as a result of deep regional and historical European 
problems. Because the Yugoslav crisis was acknowledged by the international 
community as a global task of building a new international order in the post-Cold War 
period, Japan joined in efforts to resolve the conflict and humanitarian crisis. This way, 
Japan was able to restart its relations with newly democratized Central and Eastern 
 
34 Gaikoseisho (January 1  December 31, 1997, 1997). Tokyo: Gaimusho. 





Europe and improve its economic and political relations with Western Europe and the 
EU.  
First, Japan pursued a foreign policy of maintaining peaceful cooperation, especially 
with the UN and the Contact Group. In April 1995 Foreign Minister Kono was the first 
official to visit the former SFRY after war broke out. Foreign Minister Kono met with 
Croatian officials in Zagreb and with Serbian and Macedonian officials in Budapest, 
where he clearly presented Japanese thinking that it was not possible to resolve the 
conflict through the use of military power. Japan's position advocated negotiations in 
the international arena and humanitarian aid. Summoning leading figures from 
Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia for bilateral talks in Croatia and Hungary, renewed 
expectations of Japan as peace mediator. 
Consequently, Japan enacted an active foreign policy, especially in Croatia and Bosnia. 
Japan provided extensive aid, however, there was a problem with its recognition by 
ordinary Croatian, Muslims and Serbian citizens. Therefore, in order to show a visible 
face of aid  MOFA collaborated with UNHCR on a project building a refugee shelter in 
Croatia in November 1995. This project was promoted by Foreign Minister Kono 
during his visit to Croatia. It was the practical part of Japanese efforts to expand and 
strengthen humanitarian, restoration and reconstruction aid. 
Lastly, preventive diplomacy for conflict containment held a special place in the 
Japanese approach towards Bosnia and the surrounding countries. In order to contain 
hostilities, Japan provided generous aid to Albania and Macedonia, participated in 
OSCE missions in Vojvodina, Kosovo and Macedonia. The main objective of those 
missions was the protection of minorities, providing election observers, and 
strengthening of the economic base to contribute to regional stabilization. This way, 
Japan as a G7 and Peace Implementation Committee member played a substantial role 
in the civil aspects of peace implementation and in the economic reconstruction efforts 
of the international community in the former Yugoslavia.  
Yugoslav case served as a blueprint for Japanese diplomacy in cases of ethnic conflict. 
In order to remain in good relations and advance to friendly relations with states in 
conflict, such as the case of former Yugoslavia, Japanese diplomacy acted impartially 
in international society and did not take sides in what had become international war. 
That way, Japan preserved prior and secured future economic interests in region. 
Japan used multilateral frameworks such as the UN and OSCE to extend its aid in 
civilian sector. This way, Japan avoided negative criticism from Asian neighbours by 
using the soft and smart power tools in its possession, and played its role in globalized 
world commensurable to its economic power. 
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